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Abstract
.  In the early 1990s,  U.S.  M2  growth  has  been  weaker  than estimated  while
bond  mutual  funds  have  experi  enced 
- 
1  arge  inflows.  This study assesses  whether
adding  bond  funds  to lrl2  would  yield  a monetary  aggregate  that is more
explainable  using a standard  emor correction model  of noney.  Results
indicate that it  is  important  to net out institutional  and  IRA/Keogh  assets
from bond  funds (as is done  for M2)  and  that adding  such  a bond  fu;d series to
M2  results in an aggregate  that is  somewhat  more  eiplainable than M2.
JEL  Classification  Codes:  E41,  E51,  and  E52Evidence  that ll2 is more  predictable  than lll  [Hetzel and  ]lehra  (1989)
and  l'loore,  Porter, and  Smal  l  (1990)l has  led more  economists  to use  l.l2  as an
indicator  of nominal  activity and  long-run  price pressures  IHal]man,  Porter,
and  Smal  l  (1991)1. In the early 1990s,  however,  the growth  of M2  has  been
unusually  weak,  while bond  mutua1  funds  have  grown  rapidly.  For example,  the
Federal  Reserve  Board  staff  (FRB,  circa 1991)  model  has  overestimated  in-
sample  li12  growth  by an average  of 1.65  percentage  points (annualized)  over
1990:Q3-1992:Q4  (Figure l).  This study  addresses  whether  lrl2  would  be  more
closely related to nominal  incone  and  measures  of opportunity  costs if  M2
i  ncl  uded  bond  funds.
This is  an important  empirical issue because  l,l2  is nore often viewed  as
a potential intermediate  target for conducting  monetary  po1  icy rather than as
an operating  target.  The  irnplicit assurnption  of this  perspective  that I',|2  is
endogenous  is consistent  with evidence  that (l)  nominal  spending  has  lagged
effects on M2  [Sma1l  and  Porter (1992)], (Z) the Federal  Reserve  operates
through  changing  the federal funds  rate [Bernanke  and  Blinder (1992)], and  (3)
any  liquidity  effect of rnonetary  policy on interest rates is transmitted
through  changes  in reserves  rather than innovations  in Ml or MZ  which  are
partly endogenous  IChristiano  and  Eichenbaum  (1992)j.  From  this perspective,
Itl2  is  useful not because  it  is an exogenous  policy tool of the Federal
Reserve,  but rather because  when  viewed  together  with interest rates, it  has
been  a useful  indicator  of the overall pace  of nominal  activity which  reflects
the confluence  of monetary,  other demand,  and  suppiy  impulses.
In practice, M2's  usefulness  hinges  on hov't  accurately  nominal  GDP  growth
can  be inferred from  econonetric  models, One  benchmark  model  is the FRB  model
which  essentially attributes M2  growth  to noninal income  growth  and  movements




























month  Treasury  bill  rate and  the average  yield on M2  balances, The  FRB
specification can  be interpreted as modeling  the influence  of both "exogenouso
(monetary  policy) and  short-run endogenous  factors on M2,  Because  open  market
operations  temporari  ly alter  short-term  market  interest rates [Christiano and
Eichenbaum  (1992)l and  because  deposit  rates adjust with some  1ag  to market
interest rates, open  market  operations  exogenously  affect the opportunity  cost
of M2  [Small  and  Porter (1992)].  Short-run  endogenous  factors enter the FRB
model  insofar as l,l2  is modeled  as reacting to contemporaneous  and  lagged
nominal  spending  and  to changes  in M2's  measured  opportunity  cost, which
reflects  short-term  market  interest rates.
However,  M2's  indicator properties are unstable.  Like most  money  demand
nodels, the FRB  nodels  of 141  and  M2  tend to track monetary  aggregates  until
financial  innovations  change  the structure of household  and  firm behavior.
Before 1980, the nonetary aggregate  most  watched  by the Federal Reserve  was
l'lla, which  experienced  unusual  weakness  in 1974-75  (Goldfeld (1975))  and, to a
lesser  extent, in 1979-80  (lrlenninger,  Radecki,  and  Hammond  (t981)).
In response  to these  difficulties,  the Federal  Reserve  redefined  several
nonetary  aggregates,  most  notably  M2  and  Ml  .  Although  l,l2's  velocity had  a
tight historical relationship  to conventional  measures  of its  opportunity
cost, prior to the official  redefinition  of M2  in 1980,  there  did not exist a
pub'l  ished  monetary  aggregate  that closely resembled  lil2  as we  now  know  it.  In
pre-1980  issues  of the Federal  Reserve  Bulletin, the Federal  Reserve  published
a number  of broad  monetary  aggregates  that separated  thrift  from  bank  deposits
and/or  combined  large time deposits  with selected  l'|2  components.  Indeed,  none
of these  official  aggregates  included  money  market  mutua'l  funds (MMMFs),  not
to mention  overnight  RPs  and  Eurodollars,  whose  rapid  growth  in the late-1970s3
reflected financial  innovations  that were  induced  by the high cost of reserve
requirements  in a high interest rate environment,  binding  deposit rate
ceilings (Reg  Q), and  technological  innovations  (e.9., information  and
computer  technology).  If  one  excluded  MlilMFs  from  M2,  M2's  annualized  growth
rate would  be I to 3 percentage  points  lower  in 1979:Ql-Q4  (Figure  2),  The
omission  of MltlMFs  from  official  monetary  measures  before  1980  [see Simpson
(1980)l il'lustrates how  the ex post redefinition of lt12  masks  its  long-run
endogeneity  and  hotr  M2's  strong  relationship to nominal  income  before  1980  is
an ex post phenomenon.  I
As with ltlMMFs  (and  l.lMDAs--money  market  deposit accounts),  redefining M2
to include bond  nutual funds  (Figure  3) may  produce  a broad  monetary  aggregate
that is a good  contemporaneous  indicator  of nominal  activity (i.e.,  an
aggregate  that is closely related to nominal  income  and  an opportunity  cost
neasure). Strong  inflows into bond  funds  have  occurred  during the recent
tttissing  l.l2  period  when  much  of the runoff in small time deposits  has  not
flowed  into the rnore  liquid  ll2 components.  !{hile the price risk  of bond  funds
impl  ies that they are not perfect substitutes for M2,  they generally have  low
credit risk and  enable  households  to quickly  adjust  their portfolios of
fi nanci  al assets.
One  explanation  for the missing  M2  is that it  partly reflects
substitution by households  into bond  and/or  equity mutual  funds Isee  Clements
(1991)  and  the Federal  Reserve  Board's  "Monetary  Policy Report  to Congress,"
(1993)  which  rlas  the basis for  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Greenspan's  'Humphrey
Hawkins"  testimony  to Congress  in February  19931, Indeed,  the missing  M2  has
' In this regard,  readers  should
has  periodical  ly redefined  its index
expl  ai  n past  behavior.
note  that the U.S.  Commerce  Departnent





























































































































































































































































































































































































been  accompanied  by runoffs in small  time deposits, weakness  in MMMFS,  and
large lnflows into bond  and  equity mutual  funds.  A compl  enentary  explanation
is that households  have  shifted out of l'12  into bond  funds  and  other assets
partly  in reaction to methods  used  by the Resolution  Trust Corporation  (RTC)
in resolving  failed thrifts.  Essentially,  RTC  resolutions  have  I  owered  the
perceived  return on thrift  deposits  in ways  not typically  accounted  for  by ll|2
models.2  Indeed,  much  of the missing  M2  has  coincided  with the RTC's
resolution  of deposits  at failed thrifts  lDuca  (1992,  forthcoming)].
This study provides  evidence  on  whether  M2  should  be redefined  to
include  bond  funds,  and  is organized  as follows.  First, the characteristics
of bond  funds  are reviewed. The  second  section  discusses  bond  funds  in a
I'liller-0rr  franework. The  third  section  details the bond  fund data used.
Then,  using  the FRB  nodel first  without and  then  with RTC  and  yield  curve
variables,  the fourth section  assesses  whether  MZ  would  be  more  explainable  if
it  included  bond  funds. The  last section  concludes  by interpreting  the
resu'lts.
l.  Institutional  and  Historical Background  on Bond  ilutual Funds
Bond  funds  are mutual  shares  of bond  portfolios  and  substitute for
direct bond  holdings  and  M2  deposits. This  section  explores  the
substitutability  of bond  funds  for direct bond  holdings  and  l'l|2  deposits.
Similarly,  equity funds  potentially substitute for direct holdings  of
equity and  other assets  such  as M2  balances. However,  equity funds  cary  a
substantial  degree  of investment  risk which  makes  them  much  less substitutable
for 142  deposits  than  bond  funds,  consistent  with the findings  of Duca  (1992).
'Duca  (1992)  argues  that the  RTC's  abrogation  of high  rate  small  time
deposits  has  imparted  a call risk to some  M2  deposits  and  may  have  sped  up  the
downward  adjustment  of MZ  to a lower  interest rate environment.c
For this  reason,  this  study  focuses  on bond  rather than equity funds.
Substitution  Between  Bond  Funds  and Direct  Bond  Holdings
Bond  funds  offer three advantages  over directly-held bonds. First,  bond
funds  enable  an  investor  to acquire  shares  in a diversifjed and  professionally
managed  portfolio  with only a modest  investment. Second,  bond  fund assets  in
"mutual  fund famil  ies" can  be converted  into transactions  accounts  faster and
at less cost than can  directly  held bonds. Third, mutual  funds  are more
attractive as IM,/Keogh  tax shelters because  many  funds (l)  perform  tax-
reiated accounting  for  investors and  (2) allow investors to make  the maximum
annual  IM  contribution  ($2,000  and  $4,000  for most  e1  igible individuals  and
families, respectively)  which  is smaller  than  the $10,000  size of most  bonds.
Substitution  Between  Bond  Funds  and  l'12
Bond  funds  have  several  features in common  with 1tl2  deposits.  First,
most  bond  funds  have  little  or no credit risk  because  they are heavily
invested  in U.S. government  bonds,  U.S. government  guaranteed  mortgage-backed
securities, and  high grade  corporate  bonds. Second,  nany  bond  funds  have
minimum  investment  sizes of under  $10,000  and  do not require that households
invest in $10,000  increnents  as entailed  by  directly holding  most  bonds.
Third, many  bond  funds  enhance  the liquidity  of investors by offering check
writing priviledges,  credit 1ines,  and  credit cards.  Fourth,  many  bond  fund
assets  are in "asset  management  accounts"  that allow shifts  across  bond,
equity, and  checkable  money  market  mutual  funds  at very low transactions
costs.3  This last  feature enhances  substitution between  funds  and  l.ll4MFs  when
3 "Hutual  fund families" usually allow a few  free tranfers among  money
market,  bond,  and  equity funds  within the same  family (Donoqhue's  Jilutual  Funds
Alnanac.  1987-88),  pp, l6-17).  Recently,  some  large  banks  have  enabled
households  to easiiy shift  among  these  types  of funds  and  l,l2  bank  deposits.6
relative  rates of return on these  assets  change.
Bond  funds  differ  from  l.l2  baiances  in several  ways, First,  unlike 1'12
accounts,  bond  funds  are marked  to market  and  pose  an interest rate (price)
risk.  Second,  price risk  hampers  substitution between  bond  funds  and  llMMFs
because  investors  must  consider  the capital gains  tax consequences  of shifting
out of bond  funds  into money  narket funds,  Finally,  annual  fees and  minimun
balance  requirements  linit  the relevance  of bond  funds  to the more  affluent.
0verall,  the characteristics and  recent strong  growth  of bond  funds
imply that while they are not perfect substitutes for M2  deposits, their
degree  of substitutability  may  be substantial  .  Expanding  l'|2  to  include bond
funds  would  internalize such  substitution effects,  and  thus, might  make  lt'12
more  stable.  However,  adding  bond  funds  to 112  could create several  problems.
First,  many  bond  fund assets  have  substituted for direct bond  holdings.
Second,  the mark-to-market  feature of bond  funds  introduces  an interest rate
sensitivity  that is not a direct  "money  demand"  effect.  Third, since they are
long-term  investments,  the substitutabi  lity  between  bond  funds  and  equity may
exceed  that betvreen  MZ  deposits  and  equity.  In this  case,  putting bond  funds
in lilZ  may  make  142  less stable owing  to shifts  between  bond  funds  and  stocks.
The Behavi  or of  Bond  l'lutual Funds  Since the nid-1970s
Bond  fund data are available starting in 1975  and  show  that bond  funds
grew  modestly  over the late  1970s  and  early 1980s. Bond  funds  then surged  in
the mid-1980s,  partly spurred  by tax 1aw  changes  that encouraged  households  to
shift  assets  into IM's  and  Keoghs,  for which  nutual funds  tended  to be  nore
attractive savings  vehicles  than  directly held  securities.  A relatively steep
yield  curve  1ike1y  spuned bond  fund  growth  at the expense  of shorter-maturi  ty
M2  deposits  as well.  In the mid-1980s,  both  directly  held bonds  and  MZ7
balances  of households  declined  relative to other  financial assets. For
exanple,  Flow  of Funds  (FOF)  data show  that as a share  of I iquefiable
financial assets,4  l.lz-type  balancest  and  direc  y held bonds6  fell  by 3,9
and  l.l  percentage  points from  yearends  1984  to 1986,  respectively.  By
contrast, the share  for  household  bond  funds (Investment  Company  Institute
(ICI) and  FOF  data) rose by 2.4 percentage  points.  These  data suggest  that
bond  funds  grew  at the expense  of M2  and  directly  held bonds  in the mid-1980s.
Beginning  in 1987,  the Tax  Reform  Act of 1986  severely  restricted the
eligibility  requirements  for IMs, reduced  the maximum  40lK  annual
contribution, and  reduced  the tax incentive (by reducing  marginal  income  tax
rates) to use IRAs  and  Keoghs. Tax  law changes  likely  account  for most  of the
halt  in real bond  fund growth  over 1987-89,  nith  a flattening of the yield
curve  occurring in 1988-89  (shown  later  in Figure  4).  Hore  recen y,  bond
funds  have  grown  rapidly,  rising  as a share  of liquefiable  household  assets  by
1.7 percentage  points between  yearends  1989  and  1992,  while M2-type  balances
and  directly held  bonds  fell  by 2.4 and  1,6 percentage  points, respectively.
Thus,  as in the mid-1980s,  rapid bond  fund  growth  in the early-1990s  1ike1y
a This includes  the FOF  household  sector categories  of currency,  deposits
(including  IRAs  and  Keoghs),  large  time  deposits,  corporate  equity, government
securities  (e.9., mortgage-backed  securities), tax-exbmpt  secilrities,  MMl'lFs
(including IMs  and  Keoghs),  corporate  and  foreign bondi, mutual  funds (equity
and-bond--including  IMs and  Keoghs),  and  open  market  paper. This  grouiing
excludes  assets  in pension  funds,  mortgages  (mainly  se11er  financed),
noncorporate  businesses,  security  credit, and  life  insurance  reserves  because
these  assets  are not very liquid,  The  category, "miscellaneous  assets" is
excluded  because  it  is constructed  as a residuai,
_ 
5-The  sum  of l,lMMFs,  currency,  and  deposits.  This series differs  from  M2
in including  IMs and  Keoghs,  bu1  is consistent  with FOF  data  used  to define
"l  iquefiable  assets"  in its timing (yearend)  and  ownership  (households).
6 This includes  the FOF  categories  of government  securities, corporate
and  foreign bonds,  and  tax-exempf  securitie!.8
reflected  substitution  out of M2-type  balances  and  direct holdings  of bonds.
The  most  recent surge  in bond  funds  appears  to partly reflect  shifts
from  M2  components  that are most  substitutable for  bond  funds.  Some  of the
bond  fund inflows likely  came  from  smal'l  time deposits, which  have  been  been
decl  ining sharply.  In addition,  since  the costs  of transferring  assets
between  bonds  and  llMMFs  within an asset  management  account  are small, one
would  expect  that some  substitution between  M2  and  bonds  wouid  occur  more
specifically  between  bond  and  money  market  funds.  Consistent  with this  view,
strong bond  inflows over 1990-92  have  coincided  with weakness  in MMMFs.
Although  bond  funds  are still  small relative to the stock of ltl2,  their  recent
rapid growth  may  account  for some  of the recent unusual  weakness  in the growth
rate of M2  as suggested  by anecdotal  evidence  (see  Clements  1991).
2. Theoreti  cal Considerations  Regarding  Bond  Funds
The  increased  popularity of bond  funds  owes  to two factors.  First,  bond
funds  reduce  the costs to households  of transferring assets  from  bonds  into
transactions  accounts  (e.9., MMMFs),  Second,  the substantial  steepness  in the
yield curve  during the early 1990s  has  made  bond  funds  more  attractive
relative to medium-term  bank  deposits.T These  factors can  be analyzed  using
Milbourne's  (1986)  model  of financial innovation  and  liquid assets.
l'lilbourne's  framework  is a modified  Miller-Orr  model  [Miller and  0rr
(1966)l  in which  households  face  stochastic  net cash  flows  in a world  of three
financial assets: transactions  accounts  yielding a return  of rr, savings
accounts  at banks  yielding r", and  bonds  yielding ro which  have  virtually no
credit risk.  Changes  in net cash  flow are stochastic  with a mean  of 0 and
7l'lost  small  time  deposits  have  maturities  of 1-year  or less, and  the
longest  naturities  typically  range  between  2-l/2  and  5 years.  The  effective
naturities  of bond  funds  primarily fall  into a range  from  3 to 10  years.9
variance  d.  Uhenever  transactions  balances  hit  zero, funds  are transferred
into transactions  accounts  from  either savings  accounts  or from bonds  at a
fixed cost.  ilbourne assumes  that rm  (  r" (  rsr and  that the fixed cost of
transferring funds  from  bonds  into transactions  accounts  (F) is greater than
that of shifting  funds  from  savings  to transactions  accounts  (c).  Owing  to
the latter assumption,  l'lilbourne's  model  impl  ies that households  will  hold  a
portfolio of all  three  financial assets,  and  that transactions  deposits  (T),
small  time  deposits  (S), and  total il2  deposits  (M2  = S  + T) equal:
r  = (4n)zt3dl31c71r0-r.l)t/3  ,
s  = (4ft)zt3dtslpy1ro-r,l)1/3,  and





Milbourne  shows  that, with ro > rs, M2,  > 0, which  implies  that a fall  in p
will  lead to slower  H2  growth.  In this model  , the development  of bond  funds
and  "mutual  fund families" lowers  p and  increases  the risk-adjusted return on
bonds  relative  to money  (holding  non-risk adjusted  interest rates constant)  by
making  it  easier  to obtain  a well  -diversified  portfolio of bonds.
However,  Milbourne's  results are  relevant  for long-run,  equilibrium
analysis  because  substitution  between  M2  and  bond  funds  entails fixed costs.
These  costs include  gaining information  on mutual  funds, front load fees, exit
fees, fixed annual  fees (typically $75-$100),  and  meeting  minimum  required
investments  (typically  $lO,0OO)  to open  asset  nanagement  account.s As a
result,  l'.|2  rnay  not be noticeably  affected by a modest  decline in the cost of
transferring monies  from  bond  to money  market  funds (F) or by a nrodest  rise  in
8 Mininurn  balances  to open  just a bond  mutual  fund  account  are  as low  as
$500  - $1,000,  but  are  typically  $10,000  to open  an  asset  management  account
that allows  shifting among  bond,  equity, and  money  rnarket  mutual  funds,l0
the yie'ld  spread  between  bond  and  small  time  deposit  yields ([ro - r"J).  It
is thus  plausible  that l'12  will  be  substantially  affected  by  only large  changes
in transfer costs or the spread  between  long- and  short-term  interest rates.
Anecdotal  evidence  is consistent  with this view.  For  example,  despite
the falling  costs of transferring assets  from  bond  to money  funds  during the
late  1980s  and  early 1990s,  real bond  fund  growth  (using  the GDP  deflator) was
economically  significant in only two  periods  since  1982,  1985-6  and  1990-92'
both of which  vlere  marked  by very steep  yield curves  (Figure  4).  However,  of
these  two  periods,  the mid-1980s'  surge  was  much  larger relative to the slope
of the  yield curve. One  explanation  for this disparity is that the mid-1980s'
surge  partly reflected shifts  from  directly  held bonds  to  IRAs  and  40lKs
invested  in bond  funds  when  tax deductibility  was  more  generous. A comple-
nentary  factor was  that many  households  may  have  learned  about  bond  funds  in
the mid-1980s  when  IM/Keogh  eligibility  requirements  were  I  iberal  ized.
One  approach  to handling  substitution between  M2  and  bond  funds  is to
include  the spread  between  long-term  and  short-term  Treasury  rates in M2
regressions.  However,  this method  is unlikely to pick up  surges  in bond  funds
owing  to tax code  changes  and  the rapid growth  of new  instrurnents  during
periods  of innovation. One  other  approach  to handling  these  sorts of empiri-
cal difficulties  is to expand  the definition of lil2,  as in the past  when  MMMFs
and  lilMDAs  were  added  to M2.  This is the method  used  here.  Specifically,  this
study  compares  the demand  for M2  with that for l'12  plus bond  funds, while
accounting  for  (and  adjusting) the ltl2  opportunity  cost neasures,
3. lleasuring  Bond  Funds
Three  measures  of bond  funds  were  constructed: total , household'  and








































































































































institution-held  bond  funds  to create  a series  that is more  similar to M2,
which  includes  personal  but excludes  institutional holdings  of MI'1MFs.  The
third  measure  also nets out IM  and  Keogh  bond  fund assets  to make  a series
that is more  comparable  to M2,  which  also excludes  IRA  and  Keogh  balances.
This  section  begins  by  estimating  institutional holdings  of bond  funds  and
measuring  total  household  bond  fund assets.  Then,  a household  measure  is
constructed  that excludes  IM/Keogh  balances  (see  Figure  5).
Several  categories  of data on bond  and  equity fund assets  since 1975  are
available  from  the Investnent  Company  Institute (ICI).  These  can  be
classified into bond  (BF),  equity, and  mixed  funds. The  mixed  funds  tend  to
hold more  equity than bonds,  and  were  treated as equity funds.  Bond  fund
categories  r'rere  aggregated  to form  BF,  which  was  added  to M2  to construct
BFMz.
One  difficulty  with BF  is that it  aggregates  holdings  by households  and
institutions, whereas  ltlMMFs  held  by institutions are not included  in M2. To
handle  this problem,  bond  fund  assets  of institutions were  netted  out using
internal ICI data  on institutional assets  (Appendix  A).e These  monthly
outstandings  were  then seasonaily  adjusted  with an X'11 procedure  to measure
household  bond  fund (HBF)  assets,  which  was  then added  to M2  to form  HBFM2.
Because  M2  excludes  balances  in  IM  and  Keogh  accounts,  another  series
was  constructed  that excludes  IM,/Keogh  balances. This was  done  by
subtracting IM  and  Keogh  balances  from  the noninstitutional  , NSA  levels of
e  Appendix  A uses  a classification  scheme  similar to that used  by Federal
Reserve  Board  staff,  but differs  in using  detailed data to make  adjustments
for  institutional  and  IRA/Keogh  holdings.  The  data produced  in Appendix  A are
much  better than the data used  by Duca  (1992),  which  were  not adjusted  for
IM,/Keoghs  and  which  assuned  that the institutional  share  of mutual  fund
assets  was  constant  across  time and  mutual  fund categories,t2
assets  in the categories  comprising  bond  funds.  The  resulting aggregate  was
seasonally  adjusted  with an X'Il  procedure  to form  HBFIM  (see  Appendix  B)'
which, in turn, nas added  to seasonally  adjusted  M2  to form  HBFIMM2,  Given
the low level of bond  funds  in 1975:Ql  when  data  were  first  collected, bond
fund balances  were  set at 0 in previous  quarters  to have  a long sample  period.
4.  lloney  llodel Resul  ts
Because  bond  funds  are substitutes for ltlZ  and  other assets (especially
directly  held bonds),  it  is  an empirical issue  whether  adding  bond  funds  to l'12
yields an aggregate  that is better explained  by money  models  than ll2.  Using
the FRB  nrodel  of  l'|2  as a benchmark,  this  study estimates ]42,,  Btl4?,  HBFMZ,  and
HBFIRAI{Z.  This section  first  discusses  the relative the fits  of these  series
using  the FRB  model  and  a modified  specification  over  both  a fu11-sample
period  and  a recent  subsanple.  Then,  model  stability  is assessed  by looking
at Chow  tests and  the stabil ity  of key  parameters  (e.9.,  the error corection
coefficient and  long-run  opportunity  cost  e1  asticity).
Results  using  the FRB  model  over  1964:Ql-92:Q4  are  listed in Table  l.
The  FRB  specification is  an error-  correct  i  on model  which  uses  GDP  as a long-
run scale  variable,  consumption  expenditures  as a short-run  scale  variable,
and  the spread  between  the weighted  average  yield on H2  components  and  the 3-
month  Treasury  rate as the opportunity  cost of money  (see  Table  3 for  variable
definitions  and  see  ltloore,  Porter, and  Small (1990)  for  a discussion  of this
model),  For consistency,  the weighted  average  yields on the bond-fund-
adjusted  series were  calculated  to reflect  the yield  on bond  funds  which  was
proxied by the lO-year  Treasury  yield.  (0ne  might argue  that the opportunity
cost of bond  funds  should  be set equal  to zero in terms  of the 3-month









































assets  having  similar interest rate, credit,  and  prepayment  risks.  The
quantitative results gave  nuch  more  support  to adding  bond  funds  to 1,12.)  The
adjusted  R2's  of the bond  fund series are similar,  ranging  from .7089  to
.7096,  and  are somewhat  better than that of M2  (,6961).
Table  2 presents  results conesponding  to Table  I except  that the
specification  used  is the FRB  model  plus terms  for the influence  of the yield
curve, RTC  activity,  and  savings  bond  pricing on ltlZ. The  yield  curve  variable
for  each  monetary  aggregate  (YM)  is the log of the spread  between  the l0-year
Treasury  bond  yield  and  the average  yield on that monetary  aggregate.l0
The  RTC  variable  is the first  difference  of cumulated  M2  deposit  resolu-
tions by  the RTC  at failed thrifts  (Table  4).  This  variable  helps  control for
two  effects of RTC  resolutions on M2  that are not captured  by the FRB  model
[see  Duca  (1992)  and  Appendix  C].  The  first  is the prepayment  risk  created
because  in RTC  resolutions,  high  yielding deposits  at troubled  thrifts  either
are prematurely  ended  if  the RTC  directly  pays  off  depositors  or have  their
rates I  owered  by an  institution that purchases  the deposits. This  call or
prepayment  risk  is not consistently reflected in spreads  between  the 3 month
Treasury  bill  rate and  average  142  yields because  it  effectively  did not exist
prior to the start of thrift  resolutions  in 1989. As  a result, post-1988
spreads  do not fully  reflect  the opportunity  cost of 1,12.  By  cancelling small
time deposit contracts, the RTC  is also speeding  up the downward  adjustment  of
ll2  to the lower  interest rate environment  of the early 1990s. This  latter
effect  is well proxied  by the volume  of new  RTC  resolutions [del(RTCDEPO)],
while the first  effect  is proxied  by RTC  resolutions on grounds  that actual
l0  To  handle  nonpositive  1eve1s,  a Taylor
This  approxination  is the  one  used  by  the  FRB
spread  between  the 3-month  Treasury  bill  rate
log approximation  was  used,
staff in creating  the log of the
and  the average  yield  on M2.l4
resolutions have  acted  as announcements  about  the prepayment  risk  created  by
the RTC. Both  effects imply  a negative  coefficient on  del(RTCDEP0).
The  savings  bond  variable is the extent to which  the six-rnonth  yield  on
newly  offered savings  bonds  exceeds  the six-month  Treasury  bill  yield.  From
November  1982  through  February  1993,  yields on savings  bonds  held for  under  5
years  were  based  on schedules  which  paid a minimum  of 4.16 percent  on savings
bonds  held  for six-months.  During  1992,  the six-month  Treasury  yield fell
below  this 'floor"  rate and  as a result, sales  of savings  bonds  surged. To
some  extent, these  strong inflows likely  came  out of l'12  deposits  given the
small denomination  of savings  bonds  and  a naximum  annual  purchase  of $15,000
per individual  .  To  control  for this extra substitution  effect, the "modified"
FRB  model  includes  a variable (SAVBOND)  equal  to 4.15 minus  the 6-month
Treasury  bill  rate when  the difference  is positive, and  0 otherwise.
In general  , the RTC  and  savings  bond  variables have  negative  and  highly
significant coefficients.  These  results indicate  that RTC  activity and  the
over pricing of savings  bonds  have  induced  withdrawals  out of 142  into assets
including, but not limited to bond  funds.  The  lagged  spread  and  the
contemporaneous  change  in the spread  between  the l0-year Treasury  rate and  the
"own"  yield were  jointly  significant in most  of the bond  fund  adjusted
regressions,  but not in the l42  regressions.ll  The  modified  FRB  models  yield
It The  opposite  result might  be expected  on grounds  that bond  fund
adjusted  M2  would  internalize much  of the substitution fron M2  to bonds
induced  by a steep  yield curve. 0n  the other  hand,  if  the sensitivity of M2
to the yie)d curve  has  increased  over  time, then  a yield curve  variable  is
likely  to have  a large standard  error and  be insignificant  in J'12  runs.  In
addition,  by omitting  information  on  the increased  sensitivity of l'|2  to the
slope  of the yield curve,  yield curve  parameters  estimated  in such  regressions
are likely  to be prone  to ornitted  variable bias.  By  contrast, the bond-fund
adjusted  M2  series  may  implicitly control  for an increased  sensitivity of M2
to the yield curve  by internalizing  increased  subst  i  tutabi  I  i  ty,  By
implication, the yield curve  coefficients from  regressing  such  aggregates  may15
better fits  than the comesponding  unmodified  FRB  rnodels,  and  with respect  to
the bond  fund  adjustments,  produce  qual  itatively similar results,  As  with the
FRB  rnodel  , the R2's  of HBFM2  and  HBFIMM2  are higher than the R2  of l,l2
(.7611),  with the comected  R2  of HBFIRAH2  (.7705)  exceeding  those  of HBFM2
(.7669)  and  BFitl2  (.7592).  The  better performance  of HBFIMI'|Z  relative  to the
other bond  fund series indicates the importance  of making  careful adjustments
to bond  fund  data so as to render  them  more  comparable  to M2  data, which
exclude  IRA,/Keogh  assets  and  institutional  holdings  of l.lMMFs.  The  extent to
which  the fit  of HBFIRAI'|2  is  better than that of M2  is smal]er  with the
modified  model  , like1y reflecting that much  of the substitution  out of MZ
which  is reflected  in the terms  added  to the FRB  model  , is internalized  within
the bond  fund conoonents  of HBFIMMz.
One  operational  definition of the "missing  H2"  is the average  growth
rate shortfall  of the four actual M2  series over 1990:Q3-92:Q4.  l,lith respect
to the missing  li'12,  the average  M2  growth  rate shortfall  over 1990:Q3-92:Q4
using  the unmodified  FRB  model  is 1.66  percentage  points, 1.27  percentage
points  nith total bond  funds,  1.44  percentage  points  with household  bond
funds, and  1.52 percentage  points with the IM,/Keogh  adjusted  bond  funds
(Tab1e  1).  Results  from  both  specifications  indicate  that estimated  M2  growth
rate shortfalls  are smaller  when  bond  fund adjustments  are made.
The  importance  of bond  fund adjustnrents  by this  criteria  is much  smaller
using  the modified  FRB  model  (Table  2), 
'likely 
because  the nodifications
control for much  of the substitution out of l'12  into bond  funds  induced  by
be  much  less subject  to omitted  variable  bias and  be  more  stable  over  time
than those  estimated  for M2.  For these  reasons,  yield  curve  coefficients
estimated  for  bond  fund adjusted  M2  aggregates  may  have  the hypothesizec
negative  signs,  have  smaller  standard  errors, and  be  statistically  significant
in contrast to parameters  estimated  for M2.16
yield  curve, RTC,  and  savings  bond  effects that are not accounted  for  in the
FRB  model  ,  but which  are internalized by adding  bond  funds.  Nevertheless,  the
S,S.E,'s  of all  three  bond  fund  series  are  lower  over  this period  than  that of
the unadjusted  M2  series using  each  model;  using  the preferred, modified  FRB
specification,  the S.S.E.  of HBFIMMZ  is 19  percent  snaller over  1990:Q3-
92:Q4.  [The  corrected  R2  of HBFIMM2  is slightly better than  that of M2  with
this model  in the pre-1990  period,  as  well, only to a larger degree.l
The  extent to which  HBFIRAMz  outoerforms  H2  is  understated  for two  data-
related reasons. First,  the bond  fund adjustments  are based  on averaging  end-
day-of-month  outstandings  to construct  month  average  levels.  By  contrast, l'12
is largely based  on averaging  daily deposit balances  to construct  month
average  levels,  As a result of having  much  fewer  data points, the bond  fund
data are more  "noisy" than M2  data.  Second,  1'12  has  an advantage  in how  it  is
seasonally  adjusted. In their use  of X'll,  Federal  Reserve  Eoard  staff adjust
M2  for  speciai temporary  factors that are not constant  across  time (e.9.,  tax
effects) before  seasonal  factors are estimated, This intervention procedure
more  accurately  estimates  seasonal  factors for M2  than the noninterventionist
procedure  used  here  to seasonally  adjust bond  funds.  Both  of these  advantages
imply  that M2  data are less noisy than the bond  fund data and, for  this
reason,  I  ikely improve  the fit  of M2  nodels  relative to the fit  of models  of
bond-fund-adjusted  M2.  In addition, because  bond  funds  are marked  to market
unlike l.l2  deposits, bond  fund assets  are sonewhat  more  volatile  than l'12
deposits. Changes  in bond  yields were  found  to be  statistically  insignificant
in other  regressions,  however,  suggesting  that this problem  is small.12
problem,  Fei  nman
funds  as a
vol  atil ity owi  ng
t' In an  alternatjve  approach  to handling  this potential
and  Porter  (1992)  use  cumulated  sums  of net purchases  of bond
measure  of bond  fund  assets  that is not contaminated  by  pricefi
Also encouraging  is that the ernor comection  coefficients,  long-term  0C
elasticities,  and  long-term  yield curve  elasticities were  more  stable  for the
bond  fund series than those  for M2  over several  recent sample  periods (Table
5).  Indeed,  the error correction coefficients for M2  decline sharply  as the
sample  is extended  into the early 1990s,  suggesting  that the traditional long-
run relationship between  M2's  velocity and  its  measured  opportunity  cost has
been  breaking  down. Chow  tests also provide  support  for adding  bond  funds  to
M2  and  of using  a modified  FRB  rnodel  (Table  5).  These  tests did not reject
the stability  of the modified  FRB  model  using  HBFIMltlZ,  but did reject the
stability  of the FRB  model  for M2  and  HBFIMM2  and  of the modified  FRB  for M2.
As a robustness  check,  "real  " versions  of the FRB  model  were  run, in
which  money  and  RTC  variables were  deflated by the implicit  consumption
deflator,  real consumption  expenditures  replaced  nominal  consumption,  and  the
moving  average  of real consunption  replaced  that of nominal  GDP. Consumption
replaced  GDP  in these  runs to avoid  the use  of two different  price deflators
and  because,  consistent  with Hehra  (1992),  using  real consumption  in the
short- and  long-run  transactions  terms  gives better results than using real
GDP  in all  the scale terms (GDP  results are not presented  to conserve  space).
Table  6 presents  regression  and  Chow  test results for the real M2  and
real HBFIMI'|Z  specifications.  l.tith  respect  to the issue of whether  bond  funds
should  be added  to ttlz,  the qualitative results from  the nominal  models  were
largely obtained  using  the real models, Indeed,  the improvement  in fit  from
using  HBFIMM2  over  the full-sample  (1964:Ql-1992:Q4)  is actualiy  greater
to changes  in bond  yields.  That approach  was  not taken  here
long  run, households  may  rebalance  their portfolios or allow
losses  to affect their  bond  fund holdings.  For example,  the
study  counts  bond  fund assets  stemming  from  the bond  market
mid-1980s  that households  kept  in their bond  fund  balances.
because  over the
capital gains  or
approach  in my
rallies of the18
using  the corresponding  real specifications. ln terms  of stabil  ity,  however,
the results are not as encouraging  for  adding  nonlM, nonKeogh  household  bond
funds  to lt12.  In particular, the real modified  version  of the FRB  model  is
stable for M2,  whereas  for HBFIMltl2  there is  somewhat  stronger  evidence  of a
structural break  in the magnitude  of squared  residuals  in 1992:Q2.
5. Concl  usion
Bond  funds  appear  to be an important  substitute for lt12  for two reasons.
First,  bond  funds  have  some  key  characteristics in conmon  with ll|2. Second,  an
lil2  aggregate  which  is adjusted  for nonlM/Keogh  bond  funds  held by households
is somewhat  more  explainable  than M2  and  thus appears  to  internalize
substitution between  bond  funds  and  M2. This result held for  both real and
nominal  nroney  specifications. The  findings  also indicate  that is important  to
net out institutional ,  IM,  and  Keogh  assets  from  bond  funds  when  constructing
a bond  fund adjusted  M2  aggregate. This result is consistent  with the
exclusion  of  IM,  institutional  MMMF,  and  Keogh  assets  from  the cument
def  i ni  ti on of lr12  ,
This study's  findings  suggest  that the case  of the "missing  M2"  is
sini'lar to two  previotis  cases  of "missing  noney'  in being  linked  to regulation
induced  innovations.  The  first  episode,  identified by  Goldfeld  (1976)  (weak
l4l and  demand  deposit growth  in the mid-1970s),  has  been  linked to several
shocks  to bank  liabilities  and  assets.  One  stemmed  from  firms switching  from
noninterest  bearing  demand  deposits  to overnight  RPs  spurred  by high interest
rates (see  Tinsley, Garrett, and  Friar (1981)).  The  other stenmed  from
declines  in compensating  balances  (business  demand  deposits)  that owed  to
shifts away  from  bank  loans  to commerciai  paper  [Duca  (]992)1. These  shifts
in business  credit  sources  were  induced  by (1) banks  rationing credit when  Regl9
Q  induced  disinterrnediation,  and  (2) banks  passing  along  the heightened  cost
of reserve  requirements  when  interest rates were  high.  By  reducing  both sides
of bank  balance  sheets,  the combination  of these  factors reflected efforts  by
depositors  and  borrowers  to bypass  the banking  system  [Duca  (1993)].
During  the Iate 1970s  and  early 1980s,  another  episode  of nissing  l'11
arose [tlenninger,  Radecki,  and  Hammond  (I991)] as high market  interest rates
coupled  with Regulation  Q  ceilings on deposit rates drove  households  away  from
bank  deposits  toward  MMMFs.  Money  funds, in turn,  purchased  higher  volunes  of
commercial  paper  issued  by firms who  shifted away  from  bank  loans.  Such
actions reduced  both sides of bank  balance  sheets  and  increased  both sides of
money  fund balance  sheets.  This case  of missing  money  was  solved  by
redefining  MZ  to include  MMMFs  (along  with RPs,  Eurodollars,  and  later lllMDAs),
thereby  internalizing any  substitution between  ltlMMFs  and  other l',|2  components.
The  current case  of missing  l'12  is  also linked to changes  in bank
competitiveness.  0n the asset  side  of bank  balance  sheets,  the adoption  of
tougher  risk-based  capital standards  has  raised banks'  cost of funding  loans
and  has  resulted in higher spreads  of the prime  rate over  market  interest
rates and  of bank  consumer  loan rates over bank  deposit  rates.  At the same
time, improvements  in technology  have  likely  reduced  the costs associated  with
issuing corporate  bonds. These  factors have  encouraged  firms to to shift
toward  nonbank  sources  of credit,  especially bonds. }lider net interest
margins  have  also induced  households  to use  consumer  installment credit more
sparingly, as well as to shift  toward  leasing autos  rather than obtaining auto
loans  from  banks. 0n  the liability  sjde  of bank  balance  sheets,  the high
spread  of consumer  loan rates over deposit  rates has  encouraged  households  to
self-finance  purchases  by  drawing  down  their M2  balances  (especially  smal120
time deposits) to pay  off  or substitute for consumer  loans [Feinman  and  Porter
(1992)1. The  steep  yield curve  in recent  years  is also  encouraging  households
to shift  from  short-maturity  M2  deposits  to bond  funds.  l'loreover,  the RTCfs
actions  can  be  viewed  as raising the true, but not measured,  opportunity  cost
of M2  by creating call  risk  on smal  l  time deposits  at troubled thrifts  lDuca
(1992,  forthcoming)1.  Finally, as shown  here,  above-market  yields on  U.S.
savings  bonds  during 1992  encouraged  shifts  out of bank  deposits.13  Together,
these  factors appear  to have  been  actively inducing  agents  to bypass  banks.
In terms  of balance  sheets,  this explanation  describes  how  banks
experience  a dec'line  in both  assets  and  liabilities  at the same  time  that bond
funds  see  an increase  in assets  (bonds)  and  liabilities  (bond  mutual  fund
shares).  In tenns  of flows, firms use  the proceeds  from  bond  issuance  to pay
off  bank  loans  while bond  funds  purchase  these  bonds  nith  funds  that house-
holds  shift out of bank  deposits. From  this perspective,  the banking  system
is not a closed  loop because  private agents  can innovate  to circumvent  the
banking  system  r'rhen  it  becomes  relatively  more  costly to use [Duca  (1993)].
However,  to the extent that the increased  costs of intermediation  to
depositories  stemming  from  regulation  cause  households  and  firms to self-
finance  their activities, they  will  result in a decline  in total assets  and
liabilities  that will  not be  recaptured  in M2  by adding  in bond  funds,
Nevertheless,  just  as MMMFs  were  added  to M2  when  MZ  was  redefined  in 1980,
recent  events  imply  that adding  bond  funds  to M2  may  tighten--but not
necessarily  fu1  ly restore--this  aggregate's  relationship  to opportunity  cost
measures  and  nominal  GDP  by internalizing substitution between  bank  and
1l In response  to
U.  S. Treasury  I  owered
the recent  costl  y
the floor rate on
surge  in savings  bond  issuance,  the
savings  bond  on  March  1, 1993.2l
nonbank  liabilities.  This study's  findings  support  this view.
Although  M2's  velocity has  not changed  much  in the early 1990s,  it  has
not moved  in line with M2  opportunity  cost measures.  Adding  bond  funds  to l,l2
produces  an aggregate  whose  velocity is more  explainable  based  on past
relationships,  For this  reason,  augmenting  lt12  with bond  funds  yields a
nonetary  aggregate  from  which  contemporaneous  nominal  GOP  can  be better
inferred based  on available money  and  opportunity  cost data.  At a minimum,
such  a bond  fund adjusted  series should  be monitored  along  with lil2,
Although  a further redefinition of ltl2  may  be needed  to account  for  new
innovations  at some  point in the future, it  is nevertheless  important  to have
up-to-date  indicators  of nominal  GDP  for making  policy in real time.  In this
regard,  it  is worth  recalling  that up  until  1990,  H2  was  a useful  nominal
indicator  frorn  the time  that it  was  officially  redefined  in 1980. Since
financial markets  will  continue  to generate  net,t  monetary  instruments  from  time
to time, vte  must  remain  open  to periodically revising the broader  monetary
aggregates.
I'lith respect  to issues  beyond  the scope  of this  paper,  future research
will  be needed  to empirically assess  substitution across  bond  nrutual  fund,
directly held  bond,  and  equity  mutual  fund  assets. In particular, since  bond
funds  were  not economically  meaningful  in size until the mid-1980s,  we  have
yet to see  how  well a bond  fund adjusted  M2  series performs  when  there is  a
major  fall  in bond  prices.  In addition, it  would  also be  helpful to conduct
empirical  studies  using  cross-section  data  on  household  portfolios, not only
to see  whether  time series evidence  of substitution between  bond  funds  and  ilZ
balances  is confirmed,  but also  to gain  an  understanding  of how  life-cyc1e  and
other demographic  factors are related to holdings  of bond  fund assets.22
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Table  1: Estimates  from  the FRB  Growth  Rate  Model  (Sample  1964:Ql-1992:Q4)
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averaqe  errors  are annual  i zed (t stati  stics in parentheses,25
FRB  Growth  Rate  Model  Results  (Sample  1964:l-1992:4) Table  2: Hodified
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(t statistics are in parentheses.  S.S.E.  data  are not annualized  and  are not
scaled  as growth  rates, whereas  the average  errors over 90:3-92:4  are
annual  ized growth  rates  .  )27
Table  3:  Variable  Definitions  For  Money  Regressions
EPCEN  = Personal  consumption  expenditures,  used  as a short-run proxy  for
permanent  income  to control for  short-run transactions' effects.
REPCEN  = Reai  personal  consunption  expenditures,  used  as a short-run proxy  for
permanent  income  to control for  short-run transactions' effects.
GDPAV  = (GDP,  + GDPr-t)/Z,  measure  of permanent  income  used  as a long-run











(REPCEN.  + REPCEN,_,)/2,  measure  of permanent  income  used  as a long-
run proxy  for trinsactions in the "real  " money  specifications.
0pportunity  cost of M2  defined  as the spread  between  the 3-month  T-
bill  rate and  the average  interest rate paid  on  H2  balances.
I in 1980:Q2  when  the Credit  Controls  were  in effect, -l  in 1980:Q3
just  after the Credit Controls  were  I ifted,  and  0 otherwise.
a dummy  equal  to l  when  ltlMDAs  were  introduced  in  1982:Q4.
a dumnly  equal  to I  in 1983:QI  to control for l4MDAs  and  deregulation,
a dunmy  equal  to I  in 1983:Q2  to control for ltlMDAs  and  deregulation.
time in quarters: 1947:l  = l,  increases  by I each  quarter.
= quarterly avg. vo1  urne  of cumulated  deposits  at resolved  thrifts.
= RTCDEP0  divided  by the implicit consunption  deflator.
= 6-month  floor  rate yield  on savings  bonds  ninus 6-month  Treasury
bill  rate when  >0, 0 otherwise,
YM  = spread  between  the constant  maturity yield on the l0-year U.S.
Treasury  secunity  and  the average  yield on a noney  aggregate.
*  -- denotes  significant at the 95%  confidence  level  .
**  -- denotes  significant at the 99%  confidence  level  .
Del  --  denotes  first  difference operator.
ilote: The  fol lowing  convergence  restriction  was  imposed  in all  runs:
2
I  J-r + the coefficient  on  Del  (log(lr|z.-1))  = I,
i-n
where  the yi are  the coefficients  on  the Del  (1og(EPCEN)_,)  terms. This
imposes  on  the short-run  dynamic  terms  the same  unitary'elasticity with
respect  to transactions  that is  imposed  in the long-run  by the term flog(M2.-
,)-log(XGNPAV).-,1.  The  relative performance  of the nrodels  is qualitatively-
similar when  this restriction is not imposed.  In order  to use  the FRB  model
as a benchmark  for conparison,  this restrjction is imposed  in all  the above
models. In separate  tests, this restriction is not rejected  for each  model.
Note  that a negative  coefficient  on flog(M2,-,')-log(GNPAV,-,')l  impl  ies
that H2  balances  adjust (error comect)  toward  their desired  lrivels.28
Table  4
Changes  in Quarter  Average  Levels  of Cumulated  Deposits  at Resolved  Thrifts
(in bill ions)
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RTCDEP  = change  in the quarterly average  volune  of cumulated  deposits  at
resolved  thrift  institutions.  l.lain  proxy  for  RTC  effects on !12.
RTCDEPo  = measure  of the quarterly average  volume  of cumulated  deposits  at
resolved  thrift  institutions (used  to create  RTCDEP).
QRTC = quarter'ly  average  volume  of deposits  at newly  resolved  thrifts  that
occured  within that quarter.
L  Note  that because  resolutions tend to occur  in the third  month  of quarter:
i)  the quarterly  average  of newly  resolved  deposits  (QRTC)  is much
smaller  than  the simple  sum  of newly  resolved  deposits  during  an  entire
quarter  (the I  ast column).
ii)  the potential impact  of RTC  activity during  quarter  t  on  l.l2  is
mainly  felt  in quarter  t+l owing  to quarter-averaging  effects.  For  this
reason,  the average  size of RTCDEP  tends  to be larger than that of QRTC,  and
RTCDEP  sometimes  surges  in the quarter following a surge  jn QRTC.29
Table  5: Model  Stability Results
Changes  in Selected  Coefficients Over  Different Sanple  Periods
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Table  6: Real  Growth  Rate  l.lodel  Results  (Sample  1964:l-1992:4)
Variable/Statistic  RMz  RHBFIMMZ  Rl42  RHBFIRAI42
Constant  .0088  .0119..  .0151'*  .0166'-
(r.e6)  (2.e0)  (3.51)  (4.31)
TIME  -.00009  -.00013-- -.0001s.-  -.00012t'
(  -1.8e)  (-3.03)  (-3.18)  (  -2.e3)
1og(Rl,t2,-.l)-log(RCAV1_1)  -.0706-  -.1210.-  -.1660'*  -.2056"'
(-2.57)  (-4.25)  (-5.27)  (-6.73)
Del  (los(REPCEN,))  .s228--  .3185.-  .3209*-  .932?"
(3.81)  (3.85)  (4.12)  (4.47)
Del  (log(REPcEN._1)) .0949  .0603  .1510  .1339
(1.06)  (0.6e)  (1.83)  (1.6e)
Del  (1og(REPCEN.-2))  .0037  .0486  .0427  .0773
(0.04)  (0.65)  (0.60)  (r.15)
Log(0c,-1)  -.oo?7*  -.0044"  -.0068"  -.0084--
(-2.26)  (-3.61)  (-4.73)  (-6.02)
Del  (1og(0c.))  -.0090"*  -.0068't  -.0079-"  -.0068..
(-3.87)  (-3.65)  (-3.ee)  (-3.87)
Def  (1og(Rl{2.-1))  .s786'-  .5727--  .4854..  .4565-'
(6.7e)  (7.2s)  (5.e8)  (6.11)
DCoN  -.0083  -.0074  -.0087'  -.0085'
(-1.77)  (-1.62)  (-2.03)  (-2.05)
DMMDA  -.0007  .0032  -.0001  .0042
(-0.2e)  (1.23)  (-0.03)  (1.78)
DU!,|83Q1  .0335.-  .ozgs*'  .0305--  .oz6t-*
(s.40)  (4.73)  (s.34)  (4.65)
DUM83Q2  -.0125  -.0148-  -.0096  -.ol2l-
(-r.82)  (-2.21)  (-r.52)  (-2.01)
Del  (RRTC).  -.00052-'  -.00048*'
(-3.71)  (-3.74)
sAvBONDt  - .0252"  -.0242--
(-4.  r5)  (-4.3s)
Log  (YMr-1)  .0003  -.0047
(0.11)  (-1.67)
Del(1og(Yt'1,))  -.00s4  -.0110-
(-r.ll)  (-2.16)
S.s.E.  (Qtly)  .00370  .00356  .00293  .00271JI
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S.S.E.  (Qt1y.  rate)
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Appendix  A:  Measuring  Household  Bond  Hutual  Fund  Holdings
l{easuring  Total Bond  Funds.  A bond  fund aggregate  was  created by summing  ICI
categories  of mutual  funds  after controlling for  several  breaks  in  ICI's
classification  of mutual  funds,  In 1975,  ICI classified  nrutual  funds  into:
aggressive  growth,  growth,  growth  & income,  balance,  income,  money,  and  bond
funds.  In 1976,  a new  category  was  begun  for municipal  bonds  when  they really
first  appeared  ($t.e million in Apri  l  1976),  and  in L977,  a category  for
option/income  funds  was  created.  (In January  1979,  a separate  category  for
MMMFs  specializing in short-term  rnunicipal  bonds  was  created (amounting  to
$31.5  million) which  is not relevant  for our purposes.)  In 1984,  ICI
internally reclassified  l)  "aggressive  growth"  funds  into aggressive  gro!{th,
precious  metals,  international  , global  equity, and  global  bond;  2) grolrth  &
income  funds  into growth  & income,  flexible portfolio, and  income-equity;  3)
"income"  funds  into government  bond,  GNl,lA,  and  income-nixed,  4) rnunicipal  bond
into long term  nunicipal bond  and  long  term state municipal  bond  and  5) "bond*
funds  into corporate  bond,  income-bond,  and  high yield  bond,
After 1983,  the following  categories  are  classified as bond  funds:
income  bond,  government,  GNMA,  global bond,  corporate  bond,  high yield  bond,
national  long  term  municipal  bond,  and  state long  term  nunicipal  bond.
Categories  mixing equity and  bonds  were  not treated as bond  funds  because  they
generally  contained  more  equities  than  bonds;  these  included  growth  & income,
flexible  portfolio,  balanced,  and  income-mixed.  0ther categories  that are
treated as equity funds  are:  aggressive  growth,  growth,  precious  metals,
international  , global equity, income-equity,  and  option/income. Since  MMltlFs
are already in M2,  they are not in the bond  fund grouping  created  here.
Based  on pre-1984  and  post-1984  categories,  bond  funds  before  1984  equal
the sum  of  "bond",  municipal  bond,  and  66.27.  of "income"  funds.  The  weight  on
income  funds  reflects  that they included  income-mjxed  funds  before 1984;  the
weight  equals  one  ninus  the ratio (33.8%)  of income-mixed  funds  in January33
1984  to the Decernber  1983  level of "income"  funds.la  (Some  assets  that were
included  in income  funds  prior to 1984  were  reclassified  into the long-tenn
municipal  and  state municipal  categories). A similar adjustment  to aggressive
growth  funds  was  not nade  to reflect  that this  category  included  global bond
funds  before  1984  because  global  funds  were  trivial  (under  0.1%  of all  bond,
income,  and  equity  funds)  in early 1984,
Adjusting  Bond  Funds  for  Institutional  Holdings. Bond  fund assets  were
adjusted  for holdings  by institutions (classified  by ICI as fiduciary,
business,  or institutional investors)  using  yearend  data  from  ICI's annual
institutional surveys. From  I985-1992,  these  data  are  classified into the
same  categories  as all  holdings  of mutual  fund  assets. 0ver  1986-1992,  the
yearend  institutional  shares  of each  avai  lable category  !'rere  interpolated into
nonthly  institutional share  estinates. From  1981-1984,  institutional holdings
are broken  out into:  aggressive  growth,  growth,  growth  & income,  balance,
income,  bond,  municipal  bond,  and  money  market  funds.  Over  l98l-1984, the
yearend  institutional  shares  of each  category  were  interpolated into monthly
institutional share  estimates  for available  categories.
one  problem  with these  data  is that the categories  of institutional
holdings  in 1984  were  limited to the pre-1983  classification scheme  for all
assets,  whereas  more  detailed  categories  on  overall holdings  were  available
for that year.  To handle  this  problem  for yearend  1984  data, the same
institutional ratio for l)  "aggressive  growth"  funds  was  applied  to aggressive
growth,  precious  metals,  international  , global  equity, and  global  bond  funds;
2) growth  & income  funds  was  applied  to growth  & income  and  income-equity
funds; 3) "income"  funds  was  appl  ied to government  bond,  GNI'IA,  income-mixed,
la Evidence  in support  of the break  adjustment  used  is  as follows.  The
sum  of the pre-1984  categories  of income,  municipal  bond,  and  bond  fund  assets
equaled  30.1 percent  of all  bond,  income,  and  equity fund assets  in December
1983. Similarly, the sum  of the new  categories  of long-ternr  municipal  bond,
long-term  state nunicipal bond,  income  mixed,  income-bond,  government,  GNMA,
corporate  bond,  and  high yield bond  fund assets  anounted  to 30.2 percent  of
al1 bond,  incone,  and  equity fund assets  in January  1984.34
and  flexible portfolio funds;  4) "bond"  funds  was  applied  to corporate  bond,
income-bond,  and  high yield  bond  funds; and  5) "municipal  " bond  was  app'l  ied to
long  term  municipal  bond  and  long  term  state municipal  bond  funds.
Using  these  comesponding  categories,  the yearend  institutional  ratios
for  1984  were  matched  to yearend  institutional  ratios for the different
categories  available  in 1985  before  monthly  institutional shares  were
interpolated. The  complete  set of institutional ratios was  then  used  to
calculate the household  holdings  in each  fund category,  [Revised  data were
used  whenever  available  (through  1991).] Then,  household  holdings  of bond
funds  were  calculated  by summing  up estimated  household  assets  in each  fund
category  based  on the break-adjusted  definition  of total  bond  funds  from  the
first  section  of this appendix.  Finally, the resulting  end-of-nonth  data (the
original  bond  and  income  fund data are end-of-month)  for  each  pair of months  t
and  t+l  were  averaged  to create  month  average  data for  each  month  t.  This was
done  to make  the bond  fund aggregate  comparable  to M2  data which  are quarterly
averages  of nonth-average  data.
Adiusting  Bond  Funds  for  IMs and  Keoghs. Internal ICI data on IM  and  Keogh
assets  were  used  to adjust household  bond  fund assets.  Unl  ike total  bond  and
equity fund data, only yearend  IRA/Keogh  data are available through  l98l  and
the categories  into which  IM,/Keogh  balances  were  classified are not as
detailed as those  for net assets.  For these  reasons,  there are more  break
adjustments  and  interpolation of yearend  data.  However,  these  adjustments  are
not likely  to result  in substantial neasurement  error as nost of them  are
ear'ly  in the sample  before IM,/Keogh  assets  became  substantial  .
From  yearend  1987  to the present, IRA/Keogh  assets  were  classified  into
the same  categories  as for overall assets.  For this  reason,  total  IRA/Keogh
assets  held in bond  funds  over this  period  were  defined  to equal  the sum  of
IM/Keogh  balances  in the following ICI categories:  income  bond,  government,
GNMA,  global  bond,  corporate  bond,  high  yield bond,  national  long  term35
municipal  bond,  and  state long  term  municipal  bond.
A sample  break  occurs  at the end  of 1987  ovri  ng to several  changes  in the
classification scheme  that was  in effect since  June  1985. First, before
December  1987,  the old definition  of corporate  bond  funds  included  the post-
November  1987  categories  of corporate  bond,  income  bond,  and  high yield  bond'
Second,  prior  to December  1987,  IRA/Keogh  assets  in global bond  funds  were
classified under  aggressive  growth  funds.  However,  this  latter  difference is
of  little  consequence  as IRA/Keogh  balances  in 9loba1  bond  funds  were  trivial
at the time of the break.  Third, the category  for  IM  and  Keogh  assets  in
income  funds  was  broken  out into jncome-mixed  and  partly  into income  bond
funds.  Because  income-mixed  funds  are not treated as bond  funds, break  ratios
for calculating bond  fund IM  and  Keogh  assets  are applied  to  IM  and  Keogh
assets in income  funds  for the period  prior to yearend  1987. For IRAs'  the
break  ratio used  is 47.3%,  which  equals  one  minus  the ratio of income-  mixed
IM  assets in Decenber  1987  to IM  assets  in income  funds  in November  1987.
For Keoghs,  the break  ratio  used  is  43,7%,  which  equals  one  minus  the ratio  of
Keogh  assets  in income-mixed  funds  in December  1987  to Keogh  assets  in income
funds  in November  1987. For these  reasons,  IM/Keoqh  balances  in bond  funds
from  June  1985  to November  1987  were  defined to equal  the sum  of  IRVKeogh
assets  in government,  GNMA,  corporate  bond,  national long term  municipal  bond'
and  state long term  municipal  bond  funds  plus 47'3%  of  IRA  assets  in incone
funds  plus 42.7%  of Keogh  assets  in income  funds,
A sample  break  also occurs  in June  1985  when  two changes  were  made  to
the classification scheme  in effect since  December  1982' First, the long-term
municipal  bond  category  was  broken  out into national long term  municipal  bonds
and  state long  term  municipal  bonds. Second,  the May  1985  definition of
"income"  funds  was  broken  out into governnent,  GNI'IA,  and  a narrower  definition
of income  funds.  In June  1985,  85.3%  of IM  and  43.7%  of Keogh  assets  in the
respective  sums  of  IM  and  Keogh  assets  in income,  government,  and  GNMA  funds36
were  in government  and  GNHA  funds.  Bond  fund break  ratios for  IM  and  Keogh
assets  in income  funds  were  revised  based  on these  factors and  the break
ratios used  from  June  1985  to November  1987. For IRAs,  the break  ratio  was
92.3%,  which  equaled  85.3%  plus the product  of (l-85.3%)  and  (47.3%). For
Keoghs,  the break  ratio  was  67.7%,  which  equaled  43.7%  plus the product  of  (1-
43.7%)  and  (42.7%). IM,/Keogh  assets  in bond  funds  from  December  1982  to June
1985  equal  the sum  of a]  1 IM,/Keogh  assets  in the I.C.I.  categories  of
corporate  bond  and  municipal  long term  bond  plus 92.3%  of  IRA  assets in income
funds  and  67.7%  of Keogh  assets  in income  funds.
Sample  breaks  occur  in December  1982  before  which  ICI collected only
yearend  data and  in December  l98l before  which  ICI did not disaggregate  IM
and  Keogh  assets  into fund  categories.  The  first  break  was  handled  by inter-
polating  December  1982  and  December  1981  assets  in corporate,  municipal,
"growth  and  income",  and  income  funds  into monthly  data.  Then,  IM/Keogh
assets  in bond  funds  over December  1981  to December  1982  were  defined  to equal
the sum  of  IM,/Keogh  assets  in corporate  bond  and  municipal  long term bond
funds  plus 92.3%  and  67.7%  of  IM  and  Keogh  assets  in  income  funds,
respectively. Using  these  formulae,  13.8%  of Keogh  and  14.5%  of IM  assets  in
bond,  equity, and  money  market  mutual  funds  in December  1981  were  in bond
funds.
These  ratios were  applied  to the yearend  IM  and  Keogh  assets  over 1975-
1980  to estimate  yearend  IRA/Keogh  bond  fund assets.  These  yearend  data were
interpolated  into monthly  estimates.  After sp1  icing the break-adjusted  data,
the end-of-month  IM/Keogh  bond  fund totals were  month  averaged  and  then
subtracted  from  the month  average,  NSA  total  household  bond  fund series.  This
series  was  then  seasonally  adjusted  to form  'BFIM."37
Appendix  B:  Measuring  RTC  Effects on ilZ
RTC  terms  were  constructed  to be comparable  to the way  M2  growth  rates
are typically  calculated.  Two  factors were  taken  into account. First,
because  the growth  rate of M2  usuaily is measured  based  on quarter'ly  averages
of month  average  balances,  a once-and-for-a1l  deposit  runoff in the first
month  of a quarter depresses  l,l2  growth  that quarter by a greater magnitude
than does  a comparable  decline in the third  month, Second,  due  to quarter-
averaging,  inflows in quarter t-l  may  have  a greater impact  on the quarter'ly
ll2  growth  rate in the following  quarter  (t).  Thus,  deposit  resolutions  in one
quarter can  affect the growth  rate of lil2  in the following quarter.  For this
reason,  the RTC  variables are based  on the quarterly average  level of current
and  prior  RTC  resolutions rather than by the contemporaneous  volume  of
deposits  at newly  resolved  thrifts.
Reflecting  these  considerations,  the cumulated  volume  of RTC  resolutions
was  constructed  in several  steps  using  monthly  RTC  data.15 First,  the
monthly  volume  of deposits  at nelrly  closed  thrifts  (RTC)  was  converted  into a
month  average  effect by dividing it  by 2 (MRTC).  Next, these  monthly  data
were  converted  into quarterly average  flows (QRTC).  This was  done  by
weighting  each  contemporaneous  month  average  flow by one-third, and  then
adding  these  to two-thirds of RTC  from  the first  month  and  one-third of RTC
from  the second  month  of quarter.  This procedure  recognizes  that resolutions
in each  nonth  have  contemporaneous  effects,  but that resolutions in month  I
have  a full  quarterly  effect in months  2 and  3, while  resolutions  in nonth  2
have  a ful l  effect  in month  3.  Next, a quarterly average  stock of resolved
deposits (RTCDEPO)  was  created  by adding  the cumulated  sum  of resolved
deposits  in prior quarters (CUI1RTC)  with the quarterly average  level of newly
resol  ved  deposits (QRTC)  .
15  The  author  owes  a
Reserve  Bank  of St. Louis
special debt to Richard  Anderson  of the Federal
staff who  compiled  these  monthly  data.38
Since  1989:Q3,  the first  difference of RTCDEP0  has  general  ly  been  larger
than the estimated  quarter'ly  shortfall  in M2  growth  from  the FRB  model  .  This
suggests  that at least some  of the resolved  deposits  were  kept within M2,
while  some  of the deposits  were  likely shifted to nonM2  assets  such  as bond
mutual  funds.
Definitions
RTC  = deposits  at thrifts  newly  resolved  during a month.
I'IRTC  :  month  average  of newly  resolved  deposits.
QRTC  :  quarterly average  of newly  resolved  deposits.
CUMRTC  = cumulated  sum  of deposits  resolved  in prior quarters.
RTCDEPO  = quarterly average  cumulated  stock of resolved  deposits.
subscript  m  denotes  month  m, subscript q denotes  quarter q, and  subscript g
denotes  first,  second,  or third  month  of quarter.
1'f  RTC,  = RTC*IZ
QRTCq = (1,/3)MRTCT=,  + (1/3)MRTC'=.  + (1/3)MRTC'=,
+ (2,/3)RTCg=1  + (l/3)RTcs=z
= (5/6)RTCs=i  + (1/2)RTCs=2  + (l/6)RTCr=3
t=j-1
CUl'lRTCqFj  =E.  ^  [RTC'=1,  q=t  + RTC'='.  q=1  + RTCg=3.  q=1J
t=0
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